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BOOK REVIEWS
The Logic of God Incarnate, by Thomas V. Morris. Cornell University Press,
1986. Pp. 220, $19.95 (cloth), $8.95 (paper).
Reviewed by ELEONORE STUMP, Virginia Tech.
In this excellent book Thomas Morris undertakes to defend the orthodox, Chalcedonian doctrine of the incarnation, which holds that Christ was one person with
two natures, a fully divine nature and a fully human nature. His purpose is not to
show that the doctrine is true but rather to rebut arguments designed to show it
false. He considers four different sorts of attack on the doctrine: (1) objections
that the doctrine is logically incoherent; (2) charges that the doctrine is incongruent
with certain cosmological claims; (3) epistemological claims that belief in the doctrine of the incarnation is unreasonable; and (4) worries that the doctrine cannot
be appropriately related to the doctrine of the Trinity. At the end of the book he
devotes a chapter apiece to each of the last three sorts of attack. All the rest of
the book is given over to his attempt to answer the first charge, to show that the
doctrine is not logically incoherent, and my review will focus on that material.
He begins by considering various simple ways of obviating a charge of incoherence, including claims that the violation of logical laws is just what we should
expect of religious mysteries and that the indiscernibility of identicals is a principle
Christians should reject. Morris quite rightly repudiates such claims as moves of
desperation. He then turns his attention to attempts at defending the doctrine by
adopting an account of it different from the Chalcedonian. For example, some proponents of the doctrine have held that Christ should be said to have only one
nature, on the grounds that the nature of anything is just the most comprehensive
set of its essential properties, so that it is strictly speaking inconceivable for anything to have more than one nature. To this view Morris replies that if we are
thinking of a nature as a haecceity or individual essence, then it is a conceptual
truth that no individual can have more than one nature, but that if a nature is taken
to be the set of properties individually necessary and jointly sufficient for membership in a natural kind (where by 'natural kind' we mean a group picked out with
reference to the fundamental structure and causal powers of the things in the
group), it is not impossible for a single thing to have more than one such nature.
Morris also makes short shrift ofthe attempt to defend the Chalcedonian account
of the incarnation by using reduplicative propositions. According to this strategy,
[S] that both unlimited and limited power, for example, are attributed to Christ
does not show the doctrine of the incarnation incoherent because omnipotence is
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predicated of Christ in his divine nature and lack of omnipotence is predicated
of him in his human nature. There is an objection to this strategy which goes
as follows: lO] for any reduplicative proposition 'x as A is N and x as B is not
N,' if "the reduplication predicates being A of x and predicates being B of x"
and if "being N is entailed by being A, and not being N is entailed by being B"
(p. 48), the reduplicative proposition is nothing more than a complicated way
of predicating contradictory attributes of its subject, x. After rebutting a rather
simplistic reply to [0], Morris concludes that [S], the strategy of defending the
doctrine of the incarnation by using reduplicative propositions, is inadequate.
I think Morris goes too fast here. From the fact that a certain defense of [S]
is inadequate, it does not follow that [S] itself is inadequate; and the challenge
posed by [0] seems to me not to be cogent. Consider this proposition, analogous
to the reduplicative proposition that Christ as regards his divine nature is omnipotent and Christ as regards his human nature is not omnipotent: Socrates as
Caucasian is light-colored and Socrates as dark-haired is not light-colored. As
the objection characterizes such propositions, it predicates being Caucasian of
Socrates and being dark-haired of Socrates; being Caucasian entails being lightskinned and so light-colored, and being dark-haired entails not being light-colored. So, applying the objection's line, we should apparently say that this proposition is just a complicated way of attributing contradictory properties, namely,
being light-colored and not being light-colored, to Socrates. What is wrong with
this analysis of the reduplicative proposition about Socrates, of course, is that
it disregards the very reduplicative character of the proposition it was meant to
analyze. The proposition about Socrates does not predicate contradictory attributes of Socrates because the contradictory attributes in question are attributed
to Socrates only in virtue of being attributed to certain separate features of
Socrates; that is, they are not predicated of Socrates simpliciter but only in a
certain respect. Similarly, the property of being omnipotent (as well as the
property of being God) is not predicated of Christ simpliciter but only in respect
of his divine nature; and the same can be said, mutatis mutandis, about the
property of being limited in power (as well as the property of being human). So
the reduplicative proposition is not just a complicated way of attributing contradictory attributes to a subject, and lO] is unsuccessful. Consequently, we do not
have a good reason for dismissing [S], the strategy of defending the doctrine of
the incarnation by means of reduplicative propositions. (Of course, to say so
much is not to say that the reduplicative strategy by itself is a sufficient defense
of the doctrine of the incarnation since quite a lot of explanation would still be
required to show that it is not impossible for one person to have two natures of
the requisite kind.)
Morris's own defense of the doctrine against charges of incoherence is founded
on two notions. The first is a distinction between common (even universal)

220

Faith and Philosophy

human properties and essential human properties, and the second is an interpretation of Christ as having two minds, one human and the other divine. Morris
argues that there is no reason for Christians to count as essential human properties
any properties common to human beings which are incompatible with divine
properties (including omnipotence, omniscience, and impeccability). He says
that although Christ was fully human in the sense that he had all essential human
properties, he was not merely human because his human nature did not include
any ordinary human properties incompatible with the panoply of divine attributes.
Being contingent, coming into existence, and being able to sin are examples of
ordinary human properties which are not also essentially human; having a body
at some past or present time during one's existence and having ordinary human
consciousness at some time in one's existence are examples of essential human
properties. This understanding of human nature is bound to strike some of
Morris's philosophical readers as implausible, and the account Morris gives of
the two natures of Christ will seem to some theologians to eviscerate the Chalcedonian doctrine. If the only constituents of the human nature Christ takes on
are those properties essential to human beings but not incompatible with any
divine properties, what I share with Christ as regards human nature seems rather
meager.
Moreover, the benefit of interpreting the human nature of Christ in this way
is not clear since in the end it is necessary for Morris to attribute incompatible
properties to the incarnate Christ, because (among other reasons) Scripture attributes various properties to Jesus, such as not knowing the date of the last
judgment, which are not compatible with standard divine properties. And in fact
Morris introduces a device for handling the attribution of contradictory properties
to Christ in his notion of the two minds of Christ. In his human mind Christ is
not omniscient; in his divine mind he is omniscient. The omniscience of the
divine mind does not characterize the human mind because while the divine
mind has full access to the human mind, the human mind has only limited access
to the divine mind. Although it is true of Christ that he is both omniscient and
limited in knowledge, in saying so we are not attributing contradictory predicates
to the same thing because he is omniscient in his divine mind and limited in
knowledge in his human mind.
So for the more customary interpretation of the Chalcedonian doctrine, which
understands the two natures of Christ as including incompatible properties, Morris
substitutes an understanding of the two natures as having properties which,
though different, are not incompatible; and he adds two minds, each of which
has some attributes not compatible with some of the other mind's attributes. He
rejects the traditional reduplicative strategy for defending the doctrine of the
incarnation but adopts an analogous strategy founded on the notion that Christ
had two minds. How successful is this account of Morris's as a defense of the
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doctrine of the incarnation against the charge that it is logically incoherent?
The account of Christ as having two minds seems to carry with it all the
problems which attach to the account of Christ as having two natures at least
some of whose properties are incompatible. How can there be one person who
has two minds? Where there are two minds, won't there be two persons? Morris
points to cases of split personality and cerebral commissurotomy to support a
negative answer to this question, but interpretation of those cases is sufficiently
controversial and the cases themselves sufficiently disanalogous to the case of
the incarnate Christ that not all readers will be persuaded. (Morris also presents
Aquinas's account of how the two natures of Christ can be comprised in one
person, but that account is grounded in medieval metaphysics about substances
and is in any case not clearly relevant to showing how two minds can comprise
just one person.) Furthermore, how are the two minds of Christ welded together
into one person? The asymmetrical accessing relationship between the divine
mind of Christ and the human mind of Christ is just the relationship which holds
between God's mind and every human mind. Why is it then that Jesus counts
as the incarnate Christ, and the apostle Peter, for example, does not? Morris
answers such questions by arguing that God owns the human mind of Jesus in
a way he does not own other minds and that the causal and cognitive powers of
the human mind of Christ just are the causal and cognitive powers of the divine
mind. But Morris doesn't say much about the special relation of ownership
between God and the human mind of Christ, and it's hard to see how to specify
such a relation between the creator and owner of all things and one particular
human mind. On the other hand, if the special relationship is established because
the two minds of Christ both operate with the causal and cognitive power of the
divine mind, it isn't clear how the asymmetrical accessing relationship between
the two minds is preserved while Christ's human mind operates with the cognitive
powers of God. To be limited in knowledge or mistaken in belief or in any other
way to have a mind which is not the same as the mind of God seems to require
acting with cognitive power but cognitive power which is not omniscient. Alternatively, if the human mind of Christ really is limited in knowledge, if at some
time Christ's human mind had only those capacities appropriate to a human
infant, say, then it is hard to understand the claim that that human mind was
operating with the cognitive power of the deity.
Finally, even if these questions could all be satisfactorily answered, Morris's
account doesn't seem adequately to defend the doctrine of the incarnation against
the charge of logical incoherence. For example, it attributes to Christ both being
omniscient and being less than omniscient. Morris holds that attributing both
these properties to Christ is not equivalent to attributing contradictory properties
to the same thing, because the property of being omniscient is attributed to Christ
in his divine mind and the property of being less than omniscient is attributed
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to him in his human mind. But it is part of Morris's account and of the Chalcedonian doctrine that the incarnate Christ is one person. But if he is a person in any
ordinary sense of the word 'person,' and if even with two minds he is still one
person, then any attributions of knowledge or ignorance will have the single
person Christ as their subject. We might suppose that even so, one and the same
person can sometimes be said without contradiction both to know and not to
know the same thing. Hearing an absent-minded man say that he knows his
phone number but he just can't think of it, we might be inclined to say that he
both knows and doesn't know his phone number. But in this example 'know'
is being used ambiguously to refer both to stored knowledge and to knowledge
held in the forefront of consciousness. With 'know' used in these two different
ways, it is perhaps the case that one person can correctly be said both to know
and not to know the same piece of information. If we restrict our consideration,
however, just to what has sometimes been called occurrent knowledge, knowledge
which is held with awareness, in the forefront of consciousness, then it does not
seem possible for one and the same person simultaneously to know and not to
know the same piece of information under the same description. But this is just
the state Morris's account must attribute to the incarnate Christ. God as omniscient
always knows everything, including the date of the last judgment, and knows it
with full awareness (an omniscient being does not have to go through a process
of recall to have access to what he knows); the Scriptures, however, describe
Jesus as claiming that he does not know the date of the last judgment. Therefore,
even on the account of Christ as having two minds, it will tum out that one and
the same person, Christ, simultaneously knows occurrently and does not know
occurrently the same thing, namely, the date of the last judgment. Morris's
interpretation of the doctrine of the incarnation, then, does after all predicate
contradictory properties of one and the same thing in just the way detractors of
the doctrine claim the doctrine does.
There is a similar difficulty in Morris's discussion of the temptations of Christ.
Given the claim that God is necessarily good and the Scriptural account that
Jesus was tempted to sin, we seem required to predicate of Christ the contradictory
properties being able to sin and not being able to sin. Morris argues with great
ingenuity that being tempted does not require the metaphysical possibility of
sinning but only the epistemic possibility. In order to be tempted, the tempted
person need only believe (even if incorrectly) that it is possible for him to sin.
So on Morris's account we are not attributing contradictory properties to the
incarnate Christ in holding that he was God and yet was tempted to sin, because
Christ was necessarily good and was tempted in his human nature only in virtue
of sin's being an epistemic (although not a metaphysical) possibility for him.
This account does keep us from attributing to Christ the contradictory properties
being able to sin and not being able to sin, but only in virtue of attributing a
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different set of contradictory properties to him. On this account, at one and the
same time Christ as omniscient knows that he is unable to sin and as human,
having the epistemic possibility of sinning, does not know that he is unable to
sin. It seems to me arguable that the reduplicative strategy applied to the traditional
account of the two natures of Christ could show that in attributing both omniscience and limited knowledge to Christ we are not attributing contradictory
properties to one and the same thing. But if so, then the reduplicative strategy
is also sufficient to show that in attributing to Christ both necessary goodness
and the ability to sin we aren't predicating contradictory attributes of him either.
My review has concentrated on the parts of Morris's book which are bound
to be controversial, but that approach must not be allowed to obscure the substantial achievement of this book. With admirable boldness, Morris has set out to
defend one of the Christian doctrines which has always seemed most vulnerable
to philosophical attack. He is obviously at home in dealing with both philosophical
and theological literature on the subject, and his treatment of the doctrine's
detractors is patient and fair. The presentation of his own account is beautifully
clear and philosophically sophisticated, and he develops his position with
ingenuity and subtlety. While I find problems in Morris's view of Christ as
having two minds, the general strategy underlying this view, of compartmentalizing the divine and human attributes of Christ and predicating them of Christ
secundum quid rather than simpliciter, seems to me certainly on the right track.
Although there is much to disagree with in the book, then, it is nonetheless a
model for the way philosophy of religion should be done. Not everyone will
agree with Morris's interpretation and defense of the incarnation, but no one
should ignore them.

The Only Wise God: The Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human
Freedom, by William Lane Craig. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1987, 157 pp., $7.95
(paper), ISBN 0-8010-2519-2.
Reviewed by WILLIAM HASKER, Huntington College.
According to William Lane Craig, "today the Christian seeking after truth will
probably learn more about the attributes of God from works of Christian philosophers than from those of Christian theologians" (p. 11). In this volume he
presents the results of philosophical work on the doctrine of omniscience, focusing
on the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and free will with some attention
given also to middle knowledge.
Craig states his belief that "any reader who is willing to take the time and
make an effort to evaluate the reasoning presented here will find it simple enough
to grasp" (p. 12). He has, in fact, succeeded to a remarkable degree in giving

